Middle East Research and Information Project
by Anne-Linda Amira Augustin
Huda al-‘Attas
(b. 1973) is an activist for women’s rights, an author of short stories and a
teacher of sociology at the University of Aden. Aden was the capital of the
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)
which existed from 1970 to 1990
under the governance of the Yemeni Socialist Party. Al-‘Attas is deeply engaged
in today’s peaceful fight for the independence of southern Yemen and the
movement (or hirak) around the “southern cause.”The “southern cause” refers to
resistance to the marginalization of southern Yemenis after the PDRY’s
unification with North Yemen in 1990. Both the marginalization and the
resistance intensified after the war between north and south in 1994, when southern
factories were looted, land was stolen and southerners were forcibly retired
from the civil service and the army. Al-‘Attas is from a well-known family in
Hadhramawt, an eastern province, but has lived in Aden since the 1980s.
Anne-Linda Amira Augustin met her in Aden and translated their interview from
Arabic.
What was life
like under the PDRY?
I lived a
quarter of my life in the south before unification. Life was different indeed.
We lived a normal life like the rest of the world.
In school we had
gymnastics and sports -- I was more skilled at table tennis than the boys. The
schools were mixed, with boys and girls sitting in the same classes all the way
through. Gender mingling was not an issue. There was no haram (prohibited) or
‘ayb (dishonor). We also had “cinema weeks” when the school took us to see
films. [1]
Citizens could
count on the state to provide education and training. There was order and we
had our rights. Of course, there were also negative things such as limits on
freedom of expression. Ideological and economic openness were missing. There
were controversies concerning socialism, but citizens lived a stable, secure
life. The regime provided welfare and the law was the same for everyone.
What changed
after unification?
First, Islamists
came from the north. Before anything was changed in the economic, security or
military sectors, the northern regime changed our progressive family law. Then
Islamists grabbed the Ministry of Education, resulting in the prohibition of
gender mingling in schools and the abolition of subjects such as music and
sports.
The first
question for them was how to change the culture and the open-minded mentality
in the south. The Yemeni Socialist Party was not the only reason for that
mentality. It is a heritage going back to the 129 years of British colonial
rule.
I believe that
the cultural attack on the south was aggravated after 1994, when legions of
Islamists came to the south. That was the first time that we saw men with full
beards. Women involuntarily donned the veil and covered their faces. It was
also the first time that we saw homeless people.
What are the
main concerns of the “southern cause”?
The problem is
that unification was a mistake. Unification did not emerge on an honest basis.
From the first day on, the south was ruled by the north. Southerners understood
from the beginning that unification was a mistake. There were many bad signs,
such as the assassination of Socialist cadres, regressive amendments to laws,
and enforcement of the northern mentality and culture. The war in 1994 cemented
all these developments.
Some people
believe that the “southern cause” could be resolved if enough jobs were created.
That should
have happened right after unification or during the four years after the 1994
war. If the regime in Sanaa had done something about jobs then, maybe the
situation would be better now.
More than 20
years later, however, we feel occupied and we feel that the south is being
destroyed. The regime in Sanaa is demonstrating that it is unable to change in
its tribal, military and religious mentality. Even the 2011 revolution of
Change Square in Sanaa restored the same powers within the regime.
The problem now
is not unity with the north. The problem is the power center in Sanaa, which
will not be able to build a civil state (dawla madaniyya) in Yemen, not even in
a hundred years. [2]
The hirak is
the face of the South Arabian revolution, the liberatory and peaceful South
Arabian revolution. We want the reestablishment of our territory and our state.
The hirak demands independence. That is what revolution means. The hirak is
also the work in revolutionary squares -- marches, demonstrations and protests.
Is it possible
that the hirak will become a political party?
The hirak is now a revolutionary element, which is why it is not
possible to transform it into a party. It is a revolutionary element of the
people. It is possible, when the southern state is reestablished, that various
elements will become parties. But now we have one objective and that is the
reestablishment of our state.
The hirak seems
to be split in two. The first group wants immediate independence; the second
would accept a federalism of two regions (north and south) with
self-determination for the south as preparation for independence.
The hirak is
the people’s revolution in the squares and streets. At all the protests,
demonstrations and milyuniyyas the demand is liberation, independence and the
reestablishment of the southern state with sovereignty in its territory. The
Revolutionary Council and all the individual groups of the hirak have that
objective. There is not a single milyuniyya that has called for federation!
What percentage
of southerners would you estimate are for independence today?
90 percent.
What is
position of the youth in the hirak?
Youth are the base
of the South Arabian revolution, in the squares and in the streets. But there
are also young people who are capable leaders and have political visions.
I often see
pictures at demonstrations of ‘Ali Salim al-Bayd, the last PDRY president who
served as vice president of unified Yemen
until 1994. How much influence does
he have in the hirak?
The people are
not with ‘Ali Salim al-Bayd -- that is for sure. The hirak emerged in 2007, two
years before he joined it. People flash his picture at demonstrations because
he shares their point of view as regards the liberation and independence of the
south. He is the only politician of his prominence who is for liberation and
independence.
The south needs
new leaders. We are planning a conference of which I am the spokesperson. The
conference will bring together all the major southern personalities, not only
the revolutionary elements, but also tribal leaders, businesspeople, scholars
from universities, women and youth. The result of this conference should be twofold:
first, to unite the leadership, and second, to unify the southern vision.
When I speak to
people from older generations, they refer to bringing back the old state, the
PDRY.
When I speak to young people, they speak more about a “new south.” What
does this mean?
The old and the
young mean the same thing. The older generation looks back with nostalgia at
the old state, but not the old regime. Not al-Bayd or ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad or
Haydar Abu Bakr al-‘Attas, and not the Yemeni Socialist Party those men once
led. The elders in our society aspire to reestablish the old state in the sense
of rule of law, honest administration and industrial development. The old state
had value for them, because civil rights, education, health care and housing
were guaranteed. There was a system and strict laws. The older generation, like
the younger generation, wants a new state that pursues the same objectives with
regard to human dignity, rights, safety, and economic and political stability.
The younger
generation uses the Internet. They want a state that is open to the world and
not closed off like the PDRY.
But in the end
the old and the young call for the same thing and that is a sovereign southern
state.
Since December
20, 2013, the satellite network Aden Live has spoken of a “people’s uprising.”
Could you tell me more about it?
In Hadhramawt
there is a people’s uprising under the leadership of the Hadhrami tribal
confederacy. It is impossible to envision that Hadhramawt will ever return to
the fold of the Yemeni state. Hadhramawt knows its way now.
In al-Dhali‘, a
province north of Aden, there was a brutal attack, a criminal assault by the
occupation regime, a war by the state against its citizens. Southerners began
to defend themselves. But the weapons of ordinary citizens cannot compete with
the warplanes and tanks of the regime.
The Yemeni
regime is waging systematic war against the south, and not only in Hadhramawt
or in al-Dhali‘. The fighting in Abyan is part of it as well. Parts of the army
acquiesce to the presence of al-Qaeda. Cells of al-Qaeda exist inside the army
itself. High-ranking officers, like ‘Ali Muhsin, have ties to al-Qaeda. But
this so-called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is artificial; it works with
the Yemeni regime to construct the image that the south is full of terrorists
and Islamists.
What about the
quest in Hadhramawt to secede from the south?
These voices
that call for Hadhramawt’s independence are few and are supported by certain
groups in Sanaa. All elements of the southern revolution are united that the
southern state will be a federal one. Hadhramawt is a part of South Arabia. And
South Arabia is a part of Hadhramawt. It is impossible to separate Hadhramawt
from the south or the south from Hadhramawt. Culturally, Hadhramawt is
represented in the entire south. In all southern provinces you can find
Hadhramis, but not in the north. There are no Hadhramis in Dhamar, but there
are Hadhramis in Abyan, in Yafa, in Shabwa. Hence, the unity of the southern
territory is the unity of identity.
The National
Dialogue Conference is over. The government is working to implement the
outcome, which stipulates that Yemen be divided into six federal regions, four
in the north and two in the south. Will federalism be implemented in the south?
The National
Dialogue failed. The south rejects the federalism that the conference called
for. We believe that it will lead to a cul-de-sac.
Is the north
stable and safe? Is the north able to build a state, of any structure, whether
a simple centralized state or a complex state with federal regions? The north
is not able to do that.
It is a big
problem for the south. We have to deal with the outcome of the Dialogue,
although we did not participate in it. But we reject that someone should
dictate anything to us. We will resist the forced implementation of the
Dialogue’s federalism, which does not serve the south and has no popular base
here.
As for the
international community, it is not contributing to a solution to the “southern
cause,” but to attempts to dislodge it.
What is the
solution?
The
international community has to understand that our region here has strategic
significance. They should not look at the south in a superficial way. The
region will not be stable if demands for liberation and independence of the
southern people are not fulfilled. The outcome of the Dialogue is a solution
for those who want to return to unity, but not to the fundamental problems. The
international community views the “southern cause” as an internal Yemeni
affair, like the Houthi issue. The international community does not pay
attention to us.
It seems that
the level of repression of the hirak is now higher.
The brutal,
criminal crackdown on southerners is itself an outcome of the National
Dialogue. The Yemeni regime thinks it now has a license to kill southerners, to
attack and imprison them without repercussions.
They have the
support of the international community, in fact. Since the end of the National
Dialogue and the passage of UN Security Council 2140, the resolution that
welcomed its conclusion, the attacks on southerners have increased in frequency
and brutality. The regime has started to attack women, like hirak activist
Zahra Salih. [3] Every day we hear about a new explosion, an attack on an
activist or a targeted killing. It is all part of an attempt to suppress the
demands of the southern people.
Will the hirak
espouse violence?
Our revolution
will remain a peaceful revolution. But it is impossible for us to accept the
daily killings by the Sanaa regime without a response.
Endnotes
[1] “Cinema weeks”
took place quarterly. In towns, the students went to theaters; in villages, the
films were shown in schoolhouses.
[2] Yemenis, in
both north and south, use the term “civil state” to refer to a state based on
transparency and the rule of law.
[3] Traveling in a
bus in Aden on April 3, 2014, Zahra Salih ‘Abdallah was attacked by masked men
with grenades. Zahra suffered severe injuries to her legs.
Image: Huda al-‘Attas (Anne-Linda Amira Augustin).
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