Yemen after Saleh

Bernard Haykel

The Majalla 

President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to relinquish his office in November 2011. He formally stepped down in February 2012 in favor of his vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansur Al-Hadi, who is now president. 

Saleh remains, however, a major force in Yemeni politics
: he is head of the General People’s Congress party, and members of his immediate family retain key positions in the military and intelligence services. Examples include his son, Ahmad, who heads the Republican Guard, and his nephew, Yahya, who leads the Central Security Services.

So far, all signs point to Saleh’s unwillingness to give up his influence, especially as long as his political rivals remain active and in a position to dominate Yemen.

One group of rivals is the Ahmar brothers, of the Shaykhly family of the tribe of Hashid, who are hopelessly divided against one another and unable to rally around one leader.

Another rival is one of Saleh’s relatives and erstwhile ally, General Ali Muhsin, who commands the first division of the Yemeni army. This trio of rivals, each of whom regards it as his right to rule Yemen, will not give up the competition for power unless all are made to simultaneously exit politics. Their continued presence represents a threat to the emergence of a stable political order in the country.

There is one principal question that policy makers in the Gulf region (as well as in the West) must ask themselves: can Yemen pursue stability and development in spite of the presence and influence of these rival forces, or is their departure is necessary for Yemen’s long-term stability?

At present, Yemen is a tinderbox that could easily become an inferno of violence, leading to civil war and perhaps even the division of the country. The rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh since 1978 has effectively stripped the country of all institutions: he governed in a highly personalized manner, keeping the government deliberately chaotic and tying all actors directly to the president. Institutions did not matter; rather, what did was whether one was in the president’s favor and a beneficiary of his patronage.

For example, after unification in 1990, Saleh re-tribalized the regions of former South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen). This was intended to dismantle the institutions of this state and create personalized links with new tribal leaders, many of whom engaged in predatory practices by expropriating land and other economic resources in the south. This is one reason why so many southerners feel that Saleh’s rule represented an occupation of their portion of the country, and the reason why some sought to secede.

This dream of separation will remain alive in the south so long as Saleh (or members of his family) remain in power. And it is this southern sentiment of being dispossessed and misgoverned that has allowed Al-Qaeda, and like-minded groups like Ansar Al-Sharia, to find refuge and support in these regions
Saleh’s resignation came in the form of a deal to transfer power brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council. This deal allowed Saleh to resign in return for immunity from prosecution; however, it did not address many critical issues, such as Saleh’s continuing political role or that of his entrenched and heavily armed rivals.

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