World Politics Review\Dr. Alexandra Lewis
Earlier this month, Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced
on state television that the country would be partitioned into six regions and
renamed the Federal Republic of Yemen. The move came at the end of Yemen’s
10-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a process that was intended to
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help overcome ongoing tensions and grievances in the aftermath of former
President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s forced resignation in November 2011. Saleh left
office after 33 years in power, the first 12 in North Yemen and the last 21 in
the combined North and South. He was finally pushed out after anti-government
protests sparked significant violence and instability, culminating in what was
arguably a civil war after two decades of low-level conflict and insecurity across
the country.
United Nations Special Envoy Jamal Benomar has argued that the NDC
“established the foundations for a new beginning” in Yemen, one “that jettisons
the painful conflicts of the past, in which power and corruption ruled.” It is
perhaps more accurate to say that the NDC has created a space for the
mainstream political negotiation of Yemen’s governance processes, a significant
development in itself, but that the new federal system’s implications for peace
and conflict are undetermined, especially because the system’s legitimacy is
already being questioned by key Yemeni stakeholders.
Yemen is a heavily fragmented country, having existed as a single state
only since its unification in 1990. It is not surprising that federalism was
proposed as a solution to the multiple competing grievances of Yemeni
communities, insurgencies and separatist movements, many of which demand
increased self-administration or independence from the Yemeni government as
part of their core political agendas. However, the six-region Federal Republic,
which breaks South Yemen into two administrative areas—Aden and Hadramawt—and
North Yemen into four—Saba, Jenad, Tihama and Azal—falls short of meeting their
expectations. Key players who have already begun to voice their disappointment
over Yemen’s new internal boundaries are the Houthis and al-Hiraak al-Janubi,
or the Southern Mobility Movement.
The Houthis are a Zaydi Shiite insurgency based out of the far north of
Yemen, in the current governorate of Saadah. They have opposed the Yemeni
government since 2004, when Saleh sent military personnel to arrest their
leader, Houssein Badreddin Al-Houthi, for instigating wide-scale demonstrations
against Saleh’s seemingly pro-American policies. Their rejection of the state’s
legitimacy is founded upon their perceived marginalization from development
programs, which they believe to be a deliberate policy against their religious
group. The Houthis have thus far fought seven wars against government forces.
In 2011 and 2012, the Houthis used the chaos generated by the Arab
Spring to establish their own federal state at a key moment when their
traditional enemy, Gen. Ali Mohsen, deserted the Yemeni army with a group of
his own troops and ceded Saadah to the Houthis to reward them for their support
of popular protests. Since then, the Houthis have expanded their territorial
control into neighboring governorates. They therefore originally opposed the
formation of the six-region Federal Republic, most likely because it would
divide their territory and absorb them into an administrative region that is
dominated by the former Sanaa governorate. There is evidence that the Houthis
have since agreed to the new map of Yemen, but their future support of the
system is likely to fluctuate.
Al-Hiraak, meanwhile, has categorically objected to the new regions put
forward by Hadi. Secessionist sentiment has been rising in South Yemen since
the 1994 civil war, when the North invaded and decimated southern cities and
disbanded the southern army. Regular protests headed by al-Hiraak have been
ongoing in southern cities since 2007, and have been met with brutal state
reprisals. This has significantly escalated hostility on the ground, and many
southern towns have now begun to fly the old People’s Democratic Republic of
South Yemen flag in a call for partition.
The North has dominated the South numerically and politically since
their unification. In 2012, the population of North Yemen was estimated at 20
million, and that of the South at 4 million. Many southerners have therefore
pushed for a two-region federal state to equalize their political
representation. However, this idea has been rejected by many northerners who
want their administrative systems to reflect the needs of a larger population.
Al-Hiraak claims that the six-region Federal Republic contravenes promises made
in the NDC that Southern self-administration would be seriously considered by
Hadi’s regime. The group is unlikely to take this slight lying down.
Also of concern to all parties involved in Yemen is the continued
independence, under the new federal system, of Sanaa, the capital. Sanaa and
its immediately surrounding territory will be classed as a federal city,
outside the jurisdiction and authority of any of the new regions. Its independence
will be assured by the Yemeni Constitution, and its administrators will be
granted special legislative and executive powers. This is potentially
problematic as it provides a foothold for the current regime to maintain its
political dominance over Yemen, in a context where the undemocratic nature of
Hadi’s government, its perceived continuity with Saleh’s rule and its lack of
transparency have all fallen under heavy criticism.
The faith of Yemen’s population in the electoral system has been weak
ever since Saleh failed to give nominated parties proportional representation
in government after the country’s very first election in 1993. Hadi was voted
into office in 2012 through an election in which he was the only candidate
allowed to stand. His categorical division of Yemen into six regions has been
made without consulting aggrieved parties and highlights Yemen’s possible
trajectory toward continued authoritarianism.
Combined, these factors paint a portrait of a country in which the major
grievances have yet to be resolved. This, in a context of continued terrorist
activity, means that the new federal system will likely not bring about the
much-needed injection of stability that Yemen is craving. However, the ongoing
willingness of parties to negotiate challenges in the mainstream political
arena in the aftermath of the NDC is a promising sign for the future.
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